Abstract-We study large population stochastic dynamic games where each agent assigns individually determined coupling strengths (with possible spatial interpretation) to the states of other agents in its performance function. The mean field methodology [14] yields a set of decentralized controls which generates an -Nash equilibrium for the population of size . A key feature of the mean field approximation (here with localized interactions) is that the resulting th individual agent's control law depends on that agent's state and the precomputable weighted average trajectory of the collection of all agents each applying a decentralized control law.
I. INTRODUCTION
For noncooperative games with mean field coupling, the Nash Certainty Equivalence (NCE) methodology developed in our past work [13] - [16] , [18] provides an effective analytical tool for obtaining decentralized strategies. The key idea of this methodology is to specify a certain consistency relationship between the individual strategies and the mass effect (i.e., the overall effect of the population on a given agent) within the population limit such that individual strategies are individually optimal responses to the mass effect and further replicate the same mass effect, and each player may ignore the fine details of any other individual player. This procedure leads to decentralized strategies for the individual players in a large but finite population. For this class of game problems, a closely related approach has recently been independently developed by Lasry and Lions [21] , [22] , while for models of many firm industry dynamics, Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy proposed the notion of oblivious equilibrium by use of mean field approximations [29] , [30] . Long run average costs and horizon discounted costs were used in [23] and [31] for dynamic games with mean field coupling. For the analysis of mean field models in the setting of mathematical physics, see [9] , [27] . To see the rich economic backgrounds of noncooperative games with many players, the reader is referred to [10] , [11] , [19] , [20] and references therein.
Although mean field models in their usual uniform aggregation form have a broad scope of applications [4] , [8] , [13] , [20] , [22] , they may be too limited to capture structural properties in certain problems. For instance, in a vaccination mean field model, each person assesses his or her infection risk and as a rough approximation may simply refer to the vaccination coverage of the overall population [4] , [8] , but in reality, the different sub-populations around the respective individuals may differently impact each person. It is obvious that an individual's close friends, colleagues (or classmates) have a much higher immediate influence than those more distant in a social and physical sense. A similar situation arises in economic models. In a crowded business area, a service unit (such as a retail store or a restaurant) and its nearby neighbors may strongly interact while the level of such interactions decreases with distance. In mathematical biology, distance dependent interaction models have been employed to study selfish herd behavior of animals [25] .
It is worthwhile briefly reviewing the extent to which game theory has dealt with the issue of locality. Blume [7] considered strategic interactions on lattice models as motivated by retailing services. Schelling [26] presented a simple line topology to examine social segregation phenomena where each agent attempts to move to a more favorable location. Despite the fact that they involve very different contexts, a common feature of the above works is their investigation of the relationship between the microscopic local behavior of individual agents and the resulting macroscopic phenomena (also see, e.g., [6] , [12] , [24] ).
Motivated by these problems, we present here a generalized mean field version of the Nash Certainty Equivalence theory of our previous work (see [13] , [14] , [16] - [18] ) which now takes into account the possibility of the local nature of agent interactions. As in [14] , our approach relies on identifying a certain consistency relationship between each individual and the mass effect but the latter may now be specific to individual agents. We will be particularly interested in addressing the validity issue of mean field approximations in relation to spatial decay rates of the interaction. The reader is referred to [28, pp. 95] and [3, pp. 60-63] for a similar validity problem in statistical mechanics. Namely, the mean field approximation is valid when the particles have sufficiently long interaction ranges.
The technical note is organized as follows. The individual dynamics and costs are introduced in Section II where the uniform aggregate cost coupling [13] , [14] is reviewed; we also identify some novel features for locality based interactions by examining their tolerable decay rates so that the mean field approximation is valid. Section III presents the equilibrium analysis for the set of strategies calculated via the NCE equation system. Section IV gives a numerical example. Section V concludes the technical note.
II. THE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAME MODEL
In a population of N agents, consider the dynamics for an individual agent dz i (t) = [A i z i (t)+B i u i (t)] dt+DdW i (t); 1 iN; t0 (1) where zi 2 n , ui 2 m is the control input, and fWi; 1 i Ng denotes N independent n dimensional standard Wiener processes. The matrices A i , B i and D have compatible dimensions. The initial states fzi(0);1 i Ng are mutually independent and also independent of fW i ; 1 i Ng. 
A. The NCE Principle With Mean Field Cost Coupling
We begin by giving a brief summary of our previous modeling of cost coupling which dealt with scalar individual states and control inputs. 
For simplicity we assume zero initial mean for all agents, i.e.,
Ezi(0) = 0, i 1. Also, we assume that the sequence of parameters fa i ; i 1g is contained in a given compact set A and has a limiting empirical distribution F (a). 
z a dF (a) (6) z 3 = ( z + )
where z a (0) = 0 corresponds to the zero initial mean assumption. See [13] , [14] , [16] for details on the construction of this equation system in a linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) context. Under mild assumptions, the equation system (4)- (7) ) in (2) . It has been shown that the set of decentralized control laws fu 0 i ; 1 i Ng results in an "-Nash equilibrium, where " ! 0 as N ! 1. The formal definition of an "-Nash equilibrium will be stated in Section III; also see [2] .
B. Illustrative Problem With Locality Dependent Coupling
To motivate the general LQG game with locality dependent cost interactions, we consider the uplink power control problem for N users in a single cell of a code-division multiple access (CDMA) wireless communication network. For simplicity of parametrization, we denote the cell by a circle of radius R c and the base station is located at its center. Let user i be associated with a locality parameter p i = (r i ; i ).
Here ri denotes the distance between the user and the base station, and i is a target signal-to-interference (SIR) ratio. Assume a system of M service classes so that i can take one of M different values, depending on the service class of user i. Suppose that the power level xi of user i is adjusted by the rule dx i = u i dt + dw i ; 1 i N (9) where u i is the up/down adjustment of the power. The N independent standard Wiener processes fwi; 1 i Ng are used to model control uncertainty during signal amplification and transmission.
Let the power attenuation of user i be denoted by g(r i ) as a function of distance from the base station. We consider a large system. After matched filtering, the interference on user i's signal as received by the base station may be denoted by (=N) j6 =i g(r j )x j + 0 , where 0 is the background noise and where =N is due to the use of a spreading code of length proportional to N [13] . Thus the SIR for user i after 
C. NCE Principle With Locality Dependent Cost Interactions
Now we formulate the LQG game with locality dependent cost interactions and generalize the basic NCE equation system to this case. To this end, we assign the agents a "locality" (or "spatial") parameter. Note that this locality parameter may have different interpretations and is not necessarily required to be a physical location. For instance, it may be used to measure the relative locations of the players or their social distances in a social interaction context [1] . The locality parameter for agent i is denoted by p i .
Suppose that the system dynamics are given by (1) . Let the cost for the ith agent be given by
where > 0, 8i = (
p p zj + ), > 0, 2 n , Q 0 and R > 0. We make the assumption:
(A1) The weight allocation satisfies:
For each fixed i, (A1)-ii) stipulates that the total weight of unit is allocated to the N agents. Compared to (12) , the use of this unit total weight condition will simplify our asymptotic analysis. For notational simplicity, the summation in (A1)-ii) includes the index i itself. Whether or not this self-weight is included has no impact on our asymptotic analysis when N ! 1. The interpretation of (A1)-iii) is that the weights are not allowed to highly concentrate on a small number of agents. This restriction is important for obtaining good mean field approximations. Bi] , suppose that the sequence fi;i 1g is contained in a compact set 2 and has the limiting empirical distribution F (). Concerning notation, whenever (or i ) is associated with the distribution function F , we make the convention that is naturally identified as a vector in d with d = n(n + m), and accordingly 2 is interpreted as a subset of d . For an agent associated with the locality parameter (to be called an -agent), let its limiting weight allocation to other agents at different locations 0 2 C be described by a probability distribution F ( 0 ) (with all probability mass concentrated on C) when N goes to infinity. At any given location, we assume independence between the weight allocation to neighbors and the distribution of their individual dynamic parameters, as shown by the following approximation for an agent with a locality parameter pi 2 C within a large population:
dF ()dF ( 0 )j =p (15) for S C and H 2. The product measure dF (1)dF (1) in (15) indicates that in the limiting model the assignment of weights to different locations 0 is independent of the distribution of the dynamic parameter . We will formalize related conditions in assumption (A4).
Denote the algebraic Riccati equation 
The initial condition for (19) is z ; (0) = 0 due to the zero initial mean assumption. We observe that when the distribution function F (1) is independent of , (18)- (21) reduces to the NCE equation system with standard mean field coupling without differentiation between neighbors. This holds since in this case r(; t) and hence R (t) are both independent of (see Acknowledgments).
In the construction of individual strategies, each agent needs to know the distribution function F (1) and the family of distribution functions fF(1); 2 Cg, but it is not required to know specific information on a particular neighbor, such as its dynamic parameter or its weight allocation in the space C.
The system (18)- (21) is constructed such that an -agent carries out optimal tracking of the local mass effect R which, in turn, depends on locality related coupling as expressed in (20) . Similar to the procedure in [14] , (19) (18)- (21), a key step is to find a fixed point r in a suitable function space for the operator 0, i.e.
(0r)(; t) = r(; t):
Lemma 1 below is proven in Appendix. Denote the norm of 0 by k0k. We have k0k < 1 for suitably small. Below we use a scalar model to illustrate the estimation of k0k. (23) . Once the above r is obtained, we may obtain the other two entries in (s ; (t); z ; (t); r(; t)). Uniqueness of the solution can be easily verified by using uniqueness of the fixed point to (23) .
III. MEAN FIELD SOLUTION ANALYSIS
For the equilibrium analysis, we need the assumption: (A4) The p i -parametrized joint empirical distribution function uniformly with respect to p i . In the indicator function of (25), each inequality holds componentwise if it involves vectors. The above condition implies that G (N) p (; ) weakly converges to the distribution function Fp ()F (); the reader is referred to [5] for related notion on weak convergence.
Suppose that we have N agents with identical dynamic parameters and the weight allocation is given by Example A. If = 1, we can show that (A4) is satisfied and in this case F p (x) = 1 if x > p i , F p (x) = 0 if x p i , where F p is specified in (A2) and (A4). For 2 [0; 1), (A4) holds with Fp being continuous.
A. Properties of the NCE Based Control Laws
Within the population of N agents, for any 1 k N , the kth agent's admissible control set U k consists of all feedback controls u k adapted to the -algebra (z i (); t; 1 i N ) (i.e., u k (t) is a function of (t; z 1 (t); . . . ; z N (t))) such that a unique strong solution to the closed-loop system exists on [0; 1). Note that the strategies in U k may use full state information. Denote u0i = (u1; . . . ; ui01; ui+1; . . . ; uN ). To indicate the dependence of Ji on ui and u0i, we write it as Ji(ui; u0i). Proof: An outline of the proof is as follows. Given the strategies of all other players, the coupling term in the cost of agent i is stochastic but may be tightly approximated by a deterministic function. Then we further estimate the performance gain of agent i if it switches to another strategy, and the estimate may be facilitated by a standard optimal tracking problem. Now, let z ; be given by (18) In the analysis below, we consider an alternative strategy ui for agent i while all other agents' strategies are given byû 0i . We may assume that u i satisfies (27) This restriction causes no loss of generality since, otherwise, u i will generate a cost higher than Ji(ûi;û0i). Based on (26) , (27) 
where ui is subject to the constraint (26), (27) and all other agents' strategies are given byû 0i .
Finally, by use of (29), (30) and the approximation argument in [14] we may show that Ji(ui;û0i) Ji(ûi;û0i) 0 N (31) where u i satisfies (27) and 0 N ! 0, as N ! 1. By the choice of C, we see that (31) is automatically true when u i does not satisfy (26) , (27) . This completes the proof.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We give a numerical example to illustrate decentralized control using locality dependent NCE feedback. We consider a population of N = 200 agents with dynamics given by (9) . These agents are distributed The associated NCE equation system is numerically solved with a time step size of 0.02. The decentralized control law is applied, and Fig. 1 shows the individual trajectories on the time interval [0, 10] . It is seen that for agents closer to the outer boundary of the annulus, the controlled powers are higher in average.
V. CONCLUSION
In this technical note we have generalized our previous Nash Certainty Equivalence methodology with uniform coupling to models with locality interactions where the weight allocation in the cost coupling affects the spatial spreading ability of interactions. It has been shown that for reasonably slow decay rates on the interaction strength, a consistency relationship between individual strategies and local deterministic mass effects can still be specified, and this procedure leads to decentralized "-Nash strategies for the individual players. Now to prove the continuity of 0f , it suffices to show the continuity of G(; t) with respect to (; t). Letting (; t) be fixed, we pick (1; t1) in a neighborhood of (; t). 
Finally, the continuity of G(; t) follows from (A1) and (A2). The lemma follows.
